The Campaign in Eelam IV - The Eastern Province

I. Introduction

1. Eelam IV consisted of two operations interlocking in geographic and temporal scope: The Eastern Operation (28.7.2006-10.7.2007) which ended with the liberation of Batticaloa West (Phase II) and the Wanni Operation (5.3.2007-18.6.2009) which ended with the defeat of the LTTE, regaining territorial control from the LTTE and the death of the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran on the battlefield. As a sovereign state with legitimate authority, Sri Lanka had an obligation to protect and ensure that all its citizens could enjoy the same rights and benefits as other citizens. During both operations, the Sri Lanka Armed Forces (SLAF) were tasked with humanitarian endeavors while pursuing a military campaign to defeat the LTTE’s stranglehold on the population and northern part of Sri Lanka.

2. This submission details a number of the main operations of the military campaign in the Eastern province war of Eelam IV, the objective of which was to defeat the LTTE and restore normal life to this area of Sri Lanka that had been unlawfully subjected to their control.

II. The Eastern Theatre of Eelam IV


3. The closure by the LTTE of the sluice gates of Mavil Aru on 28 July 2006 marked a crucial turning point in the Sri Lankan military operations. “Operation Watershed” resulted in the SLAF retaking the Mavril Aru Anicut after 16 days of heavy fighting. With the security forces in the East in control of the Mavil Aru and Muttur areas, the LTTE launched a series of attacks on 2 August 2006 around Trincomalee harbour, regaining control on 7 August. Thereafter, the LTTE launched a “massive attack on the security forces forward defence...
lines in Jaffna on 11 August 2006.\(^8\) From 11 to 14 August, the security forces attempted to recapture the Forward Defence Line, without success.\(^9\) A series of heavy battles on land and sea ensued for control of the Naval Detachment at Kilaly, Kayts Island. By 27 August, the recapture of these areas was complete and the Forward Defence Line of the security force in Muhamalai reestablished.\(^10\)

4. The LTTE continued to shell Trincomalee from Sampur and Ralkuli endangering Mitsui Cement Factory, the Prima Flour Mill and the Oil Tanks.\(^11\) Over 40,000 civilians (mostly Muslims) were displaced as a result of the fighting.\(^12\) The Muslim community leaders were adamant that as long as there were LTTE long-range guns that could shell Muttur, the Muslim community refused to return to the area. As a result the government made every effort to resettle the community rapidly, succeeding in doing so within 45 days.\(^13\)

5. In addition to threatening the lives and resources of the civilians, Sampur was of crucial importance to the LTTE both militarily and politically.\(^14\) Fourteen LTTE camps were set up on the Southern perimeter of the Trincomalee harbour, in an area approximately 146 square kilometres in size, in the general vicinity of Sampur.\(^15\) Two major Sea Tiger bases, Illakkankaithai\(^16\) and Soodaikudai\(^17\) in Sampur, continued to pose a direct threat to the Navy based at Trincomalee Harbour.\(^18\)

6. From 24 August 2006, the SLAF ultimately regained Muttur, Kattaparichan, Sekvanagar Thoppura and, after a month of heavy fighting, Sampur,\(^19\) by September 2006 using small groups of Special Force Commandos who acted as Forward Observers, giving locations and corrections for artillery and air strikes on LTTE positions.\(^20\) These operations also secured the Trincomalee Naval Dockyard and the China Bay Air Force Base,\(^21\) Trincomalee Town, Harbour and the Naval Dockyard and Manirasakulam, which the LTTE had seized during the ceasefire period.\(^22\)

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\(^15\) Attachment 8, Map of LTTE Base Concentration in Sampur Area.
\(^16\) Illakkankaithai was used by the Sea Tigers as a major launching pad, Attachment 3, L. M. H. Mendis, Assignment Peace In the Name of the Motherland, Second Edition, 2013, p. 620; Ranga Jayasuriya, Manirasakulam, Rarkuli, Upparu and Sampur, Sunday Observer, accessed at http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2006/10/29/fea02.asp.
\(^17\) Soodaikudai was used as the launch pad for suicide operations. Ranga Jayasuriya, Manirasakulam, Rarkuli, Upparu and Sampur, Sunday Observer, accessed at http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2006/10/29/fea02.asp.
\(^22\) Attachment 1, Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006 – May 2009 (July 2011), para. 157; Attachment 3,
7. Unlike the fall of Jaffna in which the LTTE allowed the civilian population to escape from conflict areas, when Sampur fell, the LTTE’s military strategy involved actively using the civilian population as a military asset.23 The LTTE took the entire civilian population of Sampur and retreated with them to the heavy jungle region of the Vakarai.24 The Security forces used Special Infantry Operations Teams (SIOTs) to launch surprise attacks on the LTTE.25 This tactic allowed civilians to escape into government-controlled zones.26 The LTTE’s strategic and tactical decision to contain the civilian population was disrupted when civilians crossed over the Pannichankerni bridge to cleared areas and freedom.27 In response, the LTTE blew up the bridge. The remaining 15,000 civilians were used as a human shield by the LTTE against frontal assault by the security forces, thereby foiling an immediate advance on the Vakarai.28

8. The LTTE had already begun to place army camps in close proximity to hospitals and use these locations to launch long-range artillery.29 During the course of their retreat, the LTTE are believed to have moved two 122mm artillery guns towards the Verugal river.30

9. On 4 January 2007, Operation Definite Victory (Niyathai Jayawa) was launched by the Special Task Force in order to clear the LTTE from the Kanchikudichcharu and Thoppigala regions of the Ampara district of Sri Lanka.31 During this operation, numerous LTTE bases were captured.32 Ten weeks after the operation began in October 2006, Vakarai fell to the SLAF on 19 January 2007.33

10. On 25 April 2007, the SLAF launched an operation to capture the Thoppigala area, which consisted of some 800 square miles of mountains and dense jungle. This was the last LTTE stronghold in the Eastern Province.

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28 Attachment 3, L. M. H. Mendis, Assignment Peace In the Name of the Motherland, Second Edition, 2013, pp. 652, and 659-661 (The hospital in Vakarai was used as a launching pad for the long range 152mm and 130mm artillery. A main LTTE camp was stationed 100 meters from the hospital and 3 mini camps were set up in close proximity to the hospital); C.A. Chandraprema, Gota’s War: The Crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri Lanka, Piyasiri Printing Systems (2012), p. 332.
29 The Verugal river separates the Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts.
30 Asian Tribune, Retreating Tigers to Vakarai blow up Panichchankerni bridge to escape the advancing security forces, 7 October 2006, accessed at http://www.asiantribune.com/node/23664; Attachment 3, L. M. H. Mendis, Assignment Peace In the Name of the Motherland, Second Edition, 2013, pp. 657 and 654, “Stanley Base” and a LTTE bomb manufacturing facility were captured on 8 January. A “medical facility” built by an international nongovernmental organisation (INGO) named ZOA, and homes for designated LTTE cadre groups the Panveer, the Mahaveer and the Makkali Pandai were found, in addition to homes of LTTE Leaders. “Stanley Base also warehoused food items either donated or plundered from INGO stocks.”
31 Including LTTE bases in Janaka; Vageyedi; Paramakanda; Ali; Nalanji; Jeevan; Diana; Elevian used for military training, uniform production, weapons, ammunition and explosive manufacturing and a detention camp. Also found were elephant skulls evidencing illegal ivory trade, marijuana farms, and a large stock of goods given as Tsunami relief, see Attachment 3, L. M. H. Mendis, Assignment Peace In the Name of the Motherland, Second Edition, 2013, pp. 654-656.
11. During this campaign, the SLAF captured LTTE military bases at Ibbanvila, Akkarathivu, Mawadi-ode, and Veppanveli in Pankudavaella North, and Naarakmulla, South of the Thoppigala.  

12. On 11 July 2007, after 13 years, the SLAF captured the LTTE’s final stronghold in the East Thoppigala (Baron’s Cap).

13. The Eastern Operation battles between the security forces and the LTTE took place in the following locations:

- Mavilaru, 28.7.2006-8.8.2006;
- Muttur/Kaddaiparichchan, 2.8.2006-6.8.2006;
- Sampur, 27.8.2006-4.9.2006;
- Gangai/Manirasakulam, 1.10.2006-10.10.2006;
- Vakarai/Kathiraveli, 30.10.2006-21.1.2007;
- Kaddawana, 2.2.2007-7.2.2007;
- Kumburuppiddi, 21.2.2007-25.2.2007;
- Batticaloa West (Phase I), 24.2.2007-11.4.2007;
- Peraru, 1.3.2007-8.3.2007;
- Batticaloa West (Phase II), 25.4.2007-10.7.2007.

14. The Eastern Operation, which ended on 10 July 2007, liberated approximately 6,000 square kilometres of land and with it a population of approximately 212,486 people. The SLAF employed approximately 15,000 troops during the Eastern Campaign. Civilians able to escape LTTE control as a result of the GoSL’s efforts during the Eastern Operation

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35 LLRC Report, para. 3.10 (counter offensive to an LTTE attack).
36 LLRC Report, para. 3.10. Muttur had some civilian villages and was under Government control when the LTTE had launched an attack on the Naval Base and Army detachment in Kaddaiparichchan; Attachment 1, Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006 – May 2009 (July 2011), paras 139-142.
37 LLRC Report, para. 3.10. Sampoor was an area dominated by the LTTE. The LTTE fired at the Trincomalee harbour and other government installations from this location; Attachment 3, L. M. H. Mendis, Assignment Peace In the Name of the Motherland, Second Edition, 2013, pp. 610-623; Attachment 1, Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006 – May 2009 (July 2011) paras 152-159.
38 LLRC Report, para. 3.10. LTTE dominated area.
39 LLRC Report, para. 3.10. The operation had been carried out by Special Forces of the Army supported by infantry. The strategy of the Security Forces had been to draw the LTTE into the jungle areas rather than have direct confrontation where civilian casualties could occur. The distance the Security Forces covered was over 40 kilometres of LTTE dominated areas. There had been around 15,000 civilians living in the Vakarai – Kathiraveli area. After the operations in Sampoor and adjacent areas approximately 30,000 civilians had moved to Vakarai – Kathiraveli area. About 10,000 had managed to cross to government held areas initially but the LTTE had used the rest of the civilian population as human shields. Evacuation attempts by INGOs were unsuccessful due to LTTE objections. However by mid December 2006 the LTTE had lost control over the civilians and within a matter of days nearly 25,000 civilians had crossed over to Government held areas and the balance had moved to Government held areas when the fall of Vakarai had been imminent; Attachment 3, L. M. H. Mendis, Assignment Peace In the Name of the Motherland, Second Edition, 2013, p. 653.
40 LLRC Report, para. 3.10.
41 LLRC Report, para. 3.10. LTTE jungle area.
42 LLRC Report, para. 3.10. Large LTTE jungle area, heavy LTTE resistance encountered by Security Forces.
43 LLRC Report, para. 3.10. LTTE dominated area.
44 LLRC Report, para. 3.10. Large LTTE jungle area, heavy LTTE resistance encountered by Security Forces.
45 In liberating this area from LTTE control, the Security Forces traversed approximately 55 kilometres North to South from Foul Point to Panichchankerni and approximately 17 kilometres West to East from from Kandalkadu to Kaladicheni, LLRC Report, para. 3.12; Attachment 1, Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006 – May 2009 (July 2011), para. 160.
46 LLRC Report, para. 3.10.
numbered at a minimum 35,000. Eelam IV began as a direct result of the threat to the lives and safety of thousands of civilians dependent on water from the Mavril Anicut. From the day the GoSL decided to liberate Mavril ARU until the end of Eelam IV in May of 2009 civilians continuously escaped from LTTE controlled areas. Civilians were often targeted for killing by the LTTE during 2006.

15. A report in August 2006 began to document the attempted exodus of civilians to India fleeing the LTTE.

16. In October 2006 the GoSL established the CCHA to address the massive challenges that would continue to arise during these extraordinary and unique operations.

17. Virtually month-by-month until the conclusion of the humanitarian rescue operation in May 2009, the military reported civilians arriving by land and sea seeking safety from the LTTE.

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48 LLRC Report, para. 3.10, fn12.


18. The continuous and unceasing flight of civilians from LTTE dominated areas during this time show the difficulty and success of the army's endeavors culminating in the humanitarian rescue operation of over 100,000 civilians during 2009 in the Wanni Operation.\textsuperscript{53}

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